Administrative Styles and Regulatory Reform: Institutional Arrangements and their Effects on Administrative Behavior by Howlett, Michael
  
International Public Management Review  ·  electronic Journal at http://www.ipmr.net 
Volume 5  ·  Issue 2  ·  2004  ·  © International Public Management Network 
13 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE STYLES AND REGULATORY REFORM: 
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND THEIR EFFECTS 
ON ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 
Michael Howlett 
ABSTRACT 
The institutional structure of an organization creates a distinct pattern of constraints and 
incentives for state and societal actors which define and structure actors interests and 
channel their behavior. The interaction of these actors generates a particular 
administrative logic and process, or culture. However, since institutional structures vary, 
a neo-institutional perspective suggests that there will be many different kinds of 
relatively long-lasting patterns of administrative behavior―each pattern being defined 
by the particular set of formal and informal institutions, rules, norms, traditions, and 
values of which it is comprised―and many different factors affecting the construction 
and deconstruction of each pattern. Following this logic, this article develops a multi-
level, nested model of administrative styles and applies it to the observed patterns of 
regulatory reform in many jurisdictions over the past several decades. 
INTRODUCTION 
At first glance, the efforts over the past several decades of governments in many 
jurisdictions throughout the world to reform their regulatory regimes (McCourt and 
Minogue 2001; Peters 2000) appear to be linked, in that reforms have occurred in many 
countries at about the same time, and with generally similar content. As the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Developments (OECD) Public Management Committee 
(PUMA) put it in their 1995 summary document Governance in Transition, OECD 
countries reform strategies have many points in common. They are aimed at both 
improving performance of the public sector and re-defining its role in the economy. Key 
reform thrusts are: a greater focus on results and increased value for money, devolution of 
authority and enhanced flexibility, strengthened accountability and control, a client- and 
service-orientation, strengthened capacity for developing strategy and policy, introducing 
competition and other market elements and changed relationships with other levels of 
government (25). 
PUMA argued that, taken together, these elements constituted a paradigm shift in 
administrative thinking. However, it is significant that some doubts remained about the 
character of these developments. As PUMA also noted, there is no single model for 
reform, and differences among countries can be seen in emphasis and take-up of 
particular reforms: Certainly countries differ at the level of individual reforms. They 
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place different emphasis on different aspects and implement reforms at varying speeds. 
The rate of take-up of reforms shows considerable variation among countries: not all 
countries are reforming the areas described . . . likewise, there are several important 
divergences in reform objectives. Some countries, for example, have set a reduction in the 
size of the public sector as a specific objective, while others put more stress on improving 
its performance and strengthening its role (OECD 1995, 25). 
 That is, administrative reforms have not been identical, nor have they always 
addressed the same aspects of administrative structure and performance. The same 
initiatives have not always succeeded in different jurisdictions, nor has their 
implementation always yielded the same results (OECD 1996-1997). While bodies like 
the OECD are still willing to argue that clear patterns of change have emerged, they have 
also been forced to concede that considerable divergences exist in the methods, practices, 
and outcomes of reform efforts in different countries. This is a finding which requires 
analysis (Howlett 2002, 2004; Lynn 2001; Bevir, Rhodes, and Weller 2003a, 2003b). 
UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM: BEYOND THE NEW 
PUBLIC MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS 
As a wave of administrative and regulatory reforms first occurred in the 1980s and 1990s 
in Western Europe and North America, the distinct tendency was to assume a greater 
trend towards convergence than is presently acknowledged and to attribute this to the 
triumph of ideological factors such as neo-liberalism, first in the most advanced industrial 
countries, then spreading through international institutions to the less developed 
(Aberbach and Christensen 2003). Central to this argument was the assertion that neo-
liberal preferences for small states and enhanced markets were codified in a new 
administrative paradigm, New Public Management (NPM), which contained a series of 
prescriptions for administration―privatization, contracting out, downsizing and 
regulatory reform―whose successful implementation was the aim of the reforms of the 
period (Ascher 1987; Starr 1990). 
In many countries these kinds of reforms are still often attributed to, or blamed upon, the 
notions contained in NPM thinking (in the Canadian case, for example, see Shields and 
Evans 1998), but the role of administrative ideas is only one of a possible set of factors 
explaining such changes (Aucoin 1990; Christensen and Laegreid 2001; Borins 2001) and 
there are serious questions as to the coherency of NPM theory and hence its ability to 
drive administrative change (Hood 1991, 1995; Dunleavy and Hood 1994; Gruening 
2001). That is, multiple efforts at reform in different countries, the patchy record of 
success and failure, and the contradictory efforts to adopt more stringent financial 
controls on government while expanding the opportunities for citizen participation in 
administrative deliberations and activities all militate against the early, somewhat 
mechanistic view of the links between globalization, NPM theory, and administrative 
reform (Pollitt 2001a, 2001b). 
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The diverse responses to NPM initiatives, coupled with doubts about the coherence of 
this potential administrative paradigm, suggest that additional theoretical and conceptual 
work remains to be done in aiding the analysis of this important era of administrative 
history (Thynne 2003; Raadschelders 1998, 2000; Eisner 1994a). A reexamination of the 
theory and concepts developed in the study of comparative public administration is 
helpful in this regard, and helps to establish a research agenda with some promise in 
moving beyond NPM-inspired analyses of regulatory reform (Morgan and Perry 1988). 
 An important step in this direction is the development in comparative 
administrative studies of the notion of an administrative style; that is, a more or less 
consistent and long-term set of institutionalized patterns of politico-administrative 
relationships, norms, and procedures. This concept is useful in analyzing regulatory 
reform for several reasons. First, it sets out the background against which reforms occur, 
providing a useful aggregate unit for describing the basic characteristics of an 
administrative system. Second, in so doing, it simultaneously provides a standard or 
benchmark against which the degree of change in such systems can be assessed, as 
reforms alter aspects of previously existing administrative styles. 
THE CONCEPT OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE STYLE 
 The general idea of an administrative style is not new, of course, with clear links 
to not only the foundational studies of bureaucracy and bureaucratization developed by 
Max Weber and others in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Weber 1978; 
Eisenstadt 1963), but also to the first wave of comparative administrative studies carried 
out after the Second World War which focused on the identification and elaboration of 
national administrative cultures (Waldo 1948; Barker 1944). The concept of such styles 
reemerged in the late 1990s in the works of, among others, Christoph Knill (1998, 1999; 
see also Heritier, Knill, and Mingers 1996) and Hans A.G.M. Bekke (1999; Bekke, Perry, 
and Toonen 1993, 1996; Bekke and van der Meer 2000) and their colleagues and has 
proven to be of some use in helping us to understand, for example, the difficulties 
encountered in the European Union adoption of EU-wide administrative initiatives. Both 
Knill and Bekke have suggested the critical importance of this concept in assessing the 
role played by existing administrative systems in affecting public policy processes and 
outcomes, including efforts to reshape the administration itself through regulatory reform. 
There are several problematic aspects of current uses of this concept which must be 
addressed before it can be applied to the study of administrative or regulatory reform in 
any particular jurisdiction. Two of the most important interlinked issues are the 
appropriate unit of analysis to use in developing and applying the concept (Heady 1996) 
and the appropriate level of analysis to which these concepts can be applied (Peters 1996). 
With respect to the unit of analysis issue, recall that an administrative style refers to two 
separate but intertwined units of analysis, one structural and the other behavioral. That is, 
while the concept of an administrative style refers to the behavior of administrative 
agents, it has a heavily structural or institutional component, as it is assumed that these 
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agents are not free-floating and unencumbered but rather operate within an institutional 
context that at least in part determines their behavior. 
In this sense, the notion of an administrative style can be situated within the confines of a 
neo-institutional approach to the study of social and political life (Kato 1996; Hall and 
Taylor 1996)1 in which institutions are defined to include not only formal organizations 
such as bureaucratic hierarchies and market-like exchange networks but also legal and 
cultural codes and rules which affect the calculations by individuals and groups of their 
optimal strategies and courses of action (March and Olsen 1984). The neo-institutional 
argument is not that institutions cause an action, but rather that they affect actions by 
shaping actors interpretation of problems and possible solutions by both constraining and 
facilitating the choice of solutions and by affecting the way and extent to which they can 
be implemented (Clemons and Cook 1999; Heikkila and Isett 2004). That is, while 
individuals, groups, classes, and states have their specific interests, they pursue them in 
the context of existing formal organizations, and rules and norms that shape expectations 
and affect the possibilities of their realization. 
In the political realm, institutions are significant because they constitute and legitimize 
political actors and provide them with consistent behavioral rules, conceptions of reality, 
standards of assessment, affective ties and endowments, and thereby with a capacity for 
purposeful action (March and Olsen 1996, 249). In an administrative context, as Morten 
Egeberg has noted, [f]ormal organization provides an administrative milieu that focuses 
a decision-makers attention on certain problems and solutions, while others are excluded 
from consideration. The structure thus constrains choices, but at the same time creates 
and increases action capacity in certain directions. The organizational context surrounding 
individuals thus serves to simplify decisions that might otherwise have been complex and 
incomprehensible (1999, 159). 
Thus, as many observers have noted, the structure of administrative organizations affects 
politico-administrative decision making by facilitating the interpretation and 
reconstruction of diverse situations into existing frames, making them amenable to 
standardized decision-making processes such as the establishment of standard operating 
procedures, bureaucratic routines, or operational codes (Allison and Halperin 1972; 
George 1969). And the existence of institutionalized rules of behavior affects calculations 
of actors interests and self-interests by defining the nature of the win-sets which exist in 
given decisional circumstances, as well as the action channels these decisions will follow 
(Hammond and Knott 1999; Scharpf 1990, 1991). 
Ultimately, structure and behavior are joined together in a distinct administrative style; a 
typical way of doing business which is both institutionally and psychologically rooted 
(Pierre 1995; Peters 1990). Together, these have an impact on the ideas that actors hold, 
as well as their assessments of what is feasible in a given situation (Campbell 1998; 
Majone 1975). The link between structure and behavior means, among other things, that 
such styles will be relatively long-lasting, quasi-permanent arrangements establishing a 
trajectory of activity which is very difficult to change―an inference which is congruent 
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with the neo-institutional idea of path dependency whereby decisions are seen as layered 
upon each other so that earlier decisions affect later ones and act as a further constraint on 
decision makers freedom of action (Pierson 2000; Zysman 1994). 
The level of analysis issue is more complex as, following this same neo-institutional 
logic, administrative styles can be seen to exist at a number of different levels of 
government. That is, from a neo-institutional perspective, an administrative style is best 
thought of as a set of administrative routines and behaviors heavily influenced by the 
rules and structures of the civil service system in which it is located. Very significant sets 
of rules and structures include macro-level ones such as the constitutional order 
establishing and empowering administrators, as well as more meso- and micro-level ones 
affecting the patterns and methods of recruiting civil servants and the nature of their 
interactions with each other and with members of the public in the course of their day-to-
day activities in the field. Not only are factors such as the nature of the political regime in 
which a system is located crucial to understanding an administrative style but so too, as 
Weber noted, are more mundane items such as the open or closed nature of recruitment, 
the basis of selection on either a career or program orientation, the nature of job 
evaluations and rank and pay considerations, as well as the presence or absence of 
opportunities for training and development (Bekke, Perry, and Toonen 1993). 
To a certain extent, as has been recognized by many authors, administrative styles and 
orders of government overlap and coincide. As Bekke, Perry, and Toonen noted in their 
path-breaking 1996 work on civil service systems, [a]lthough our definition refers to the 
state and the focus of this book is on national systems, it is not our intention to exclude 
other levels of government. We believe the logic and the analytic approaches can be 
extended to other government levels. . . . One basic assumption of this approach is that 
civil service systems, whether national, subnational, or local, vary across political 
jurisdictions and that this variation merits study in its own right and for its implications 
for the management and development of these systems (1996, 4). 
Administrative styles are composed of sets of institutions and behaviors which parallel 
the institutional structure of society. That is, there are multiple administrative styles 
which exist in a nested relationship to each other. Three critical levels are the macro, or 
national; the meso, or sectoral; and the micro, or agency level. This general conception of 
multi-level administrative styles comprised of both long-term patterns of administrative 
behavior and relatively permanent institutional structures is set out in table 1 below. The 
actual factors which determine the different styles present at each level and their impact 
on regulatory reform efforts are discussed in the following section. 
TABLE 1 
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Sectoral Regulatory regime Regulatory culture Sectoral regulatory 
style 
 




APPLYING THE CONCEPT OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE STYLE TO THE 
SUBJECT OF REGULATORY REFORM 
National Administrative Styles and Their Impact on Regulatory Reform 
Macro- or national-level administrative styles are the most well known. Weber attempted 
to identify a common set of structural and behavioral features of modern monocratic and 
traditional patrimonial bureaucracies which, he argued, transcended jurisdictional and 
temporal boundaries, but later scholars insisted his ahistorical ideal type construction 
served only at best as a useful guide to general trends (Rudolph and Rudolph 1979; 
Jacoby 1973; Chapman 1971). With few exceptions, students of public administrative 
systems have insisted on the preeminence of national systems and their idiosyncrasies in 
identifying actual administrative models in practice (Bevir and Rhodes 2001; Bevir, 
Rhodes, and Weller 2003a, 2003b; Dwivedi and Gow 1999). 
As Francis Castles has observed, distinct national administrative cultures have an impact 
on national policy outcomes, and nations tend to follow the precepts of the administrative 
models from which they emerged (Castles 1990). At the behavioral or cultural level, as 
observers from Weber onward have noted, some of the key characteristics which affect 
administrative behavior relate to such phenomena as the level of identity of civil servants 
with the impersonal order of the state rather than with more personalized elements of 
society such as religious, ethnic, or tribal groups, and the extent to which administrative 
office is seen as an avenue for achieving either the public good or personal enrichment 
(Hofstede 1980). These characteristics vary from country to country (Grendstad 2003; 
Hood 1998), and generate a basic model of national administrative cultures ranging from 
the state-oriented, public good identifying civil servant of the Weberian monocratic 
model to its opposite in the Weberian patrimonial model―with the well-meaning but 
non-state identifying or anarchic administrator and the pathological bureaucratic rigidly 
identifying with the state administrator falling somewhere in between (see table A1 in the 
appendix). 
With respect to structure, the key dimensions of state structure relevant to an 
administrative style are the nature of the civil service system, especially related to its 
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relative size and pervasiveness in society, and the means by which it is politically 
controlled and held accountable (Heady 1996). One of the chief determinants of relative 
administrative size, of course, is related to the extent to which the administration is 
involved in economic affairs, as opposed to more traditional social, military, or legal ones 
(Considine and Lewis 2003). As for political control of modern administrations, only two 
principal means have ever been used: the traditional legislative-executive means and that 
of single-party partisan or judicial control (Evangelista 1995). Such analyses lead to the 
development of overall models of national systems of administration or civil service 
systems, which range from the very active legislative or executive-led systems found in 
developing nations such as the East Asian newly developing countries to their less active 
counterparts in established Anglo-American and continental European systems, and 
include the party or judiciary-based activist administrations of socialist, fascist, and 
Islamic systems along with their less active counterparts in transitional democracies in 
central Asia, for example (see table A2 in the appendix). 
As was discussed above, national-level administrative styles can be seen to develop 
through the interaction of these macro-level structural and behavioral characteristics 
(Eisner 1993, 1994a; Harris and Milkis 1989). Authors such as Robert Kagan (1991, 
1996) and David Vogel (1986) in the U.S. 
 
and Jeremy Richardson and his colleagues in 
Europe (Richardson, Gustafsson, and Jordan 1982) have developed this notion and have 
identified a distinct set of national styles of administration, the most well known being the 
adversarial legalist style identified by Kagan. 
Table 2 identifies several prominent types of such national styles, based upon the key 
criteria used by Kagan: the level of trust found in state-societal relations, and the degree 
to which administrative behavior is rule-bound in the pursuit of its activities. 
TABLE 2 
A Model of National Administrative Styles 
  Levels of Trust in State-Societal 
Interactions 
 















The impact of the nature of the existing national administrative style on reform efforts is 
significant. It affects not only the nature and extent of the reforms that are required, but 
also the nature of the change agent required to undertake them. Since there are significant 
differences between jurisdictions in these areas with respect to regulatory reforms, the 
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implications are clear. As Franz van Waarden put it, [n]ational regulatory styles are 
formally rooted in nationally specific legal, political and administrative institutions and 
cultures. This foundation in a variety of state institutions should make regulatory styles 
resistant to change, and hence, from this perspective one would expect differences in 
regulatory styles to persist, possibly even under the impact of economic and political 
internationalization (1995, 333). 
Sectoral Policy Styles and Their Impact on Regulatory Reform 
At the meso-level, many studies have argued that existing sectoral-level policy styles 
linked to common approaches used to address common problems such as health, 
education, and others (Lowi 1972; Salamon 1981) also have a significant impact on the 
success and failure of efforts at administrative reform. As Gary Freeman (1985, 469) has 
argued, this approach assumes that each sector poses its own problems, sets its own 
constraints, and generates its own brand of conflict (see also Burstein [1991]). 
In their work on policy styles, Richardson, Gustaffson, and Jordan (1982) developed the 
foundations for a model of regulatory cultures based on the twin dimensions of the 
dominant approach to problem solving―anticipatory or reactive―and the relationship 
existing between the government and society―consensus or imposition―in the sector 
under consideration. These cultures ranged from the anticipatory rationalist consensus to 
the imposed, reactive, negotiation and conflict one―with the reactive but consensus-
oriented negotiation culture and the imposed, anticipatory concertation culture in between 
(see table A3 in the appendix). 
 Like national-level cultures, these are found in specific structural circumstances 
and other meso-level studies have identified distinct implementation 
structures―regulatory regimes―at this level as well (Harris and Milkis 1989; Howlett 
2000a; Eisner 1994b). Observers have noted, for example, that states must have a high 
level of administrative capacity and legitimacy in order to utilize certain policy 
instruments in situations in which they wish to affect significant numbers of policy targets 
(Howlett 2000b; Howlett and Ramesh 1995; Suchman 1995). This has led to the 
development of models of regulatory regimes which focus upon the severity of the 
constraints states face in terms of their financial, informational, authoritative, and 
personnel resources and the size of the target group they wish to affect through their 
activities. A regime based on the promotion of third- and fourth-sector activities by state 
agencies―institutionalized voluntarism―is likely to develop where the target is large and 
states are highly constrained, while a state with fewer constraints facing the same large 
targets is able to develop a different regime based on less institutionalized incentives such 
as the financial, instrument-based directed subsidization. Faced with much smaller or 
more precise targets, states with resource abundance can opt to provide a good or service 
itself―developing a regulatory regime of public provision with oversight―or, if facing a 
higher level of constraints, may opt for a (very common) regime of representative 
regulation using command and control instruments in conjunction with advisory councils 
to govern sectoral relationships (see table A4 in the appendix). 
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Both these studies focusing on the behavior of regulators in the formulation and adoption 
of policy options and those looking at the structural aspects of the techniques and styles of 
policy implementation suggest that distinct patterns of administrative activity exist at the 
sectoral level. As was suggested above in the context of national administrative styles, 
these sectoral styles combine both cultural attributes―legitimacy and trust―and 
structural ones such as state capacity and organization (Timonen 2001). In assessing 
administrative activity at the sectoral level in Europe, Christoph Knill pointed out the 
significance of these factors. As he argued, [t]he dimension of regulatory styles is 
defined by two related aspects: the mode of state intervention and administrative interest 
intermediation; i.e., patterns of interaction between administrative and societal actors. 
[These include] dimensions [such as] hierarchical versus self-regulation, as well as 
uniform and detailed requirements versus open regulation allowing for administrative 
flexibility and discretion. In the same way different patterns of interest intermediation can 
be identified, such as formal versus informal, legalistic versus pragmatic, and open versus 
closed relationships (1998, 2). Table 3 sets out the basic elements of sectoral regulatory 
styles focusing on these two key dimensions of sectoral state activity. 
TABLE 3 
A Model of Sectoral Regulatory Styles 
  Levels of Trust in Sectoral State-Societal 
Interactions 
 
  High Low 
 
 










As was the case with national-level styles, what kind of sectoral style exists is a very 
important element in determining the success or failure of reform efforts such as those 
aimed at regulatory reform. An inefficient administration will, of course, have difficulty 
implementing any action, including any oriented towards regulatory reform, while the 
opposite will hold true for a responsive administration. Reform efforts may become 
bogged down in an administration focused on legalistic proceduralism, while efforts may 
be well meaning but also fail to be effectively implemented in a low capacity voluntaristic 
administration. 
Micro Enforcement Styles and Their Impact on Regulatory Reform 
Styles also exist at the micro (departmental or agency) level (Gormley 1998; May and 
Burby 1998; May and Winter 1999) and many studies have identified specific 
enforcement styles used by different agencies in their day-to-day activities (Hawkins and 
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Thomas 1989; Scholz 1984, 1991). As Smith, Marsh, and Richards put it, [t]he central 
state is not a unified actor but a range of institutions and actors with disparate interests 
and varying resources . . . we need to examine how different departments behave and how 
various decisions within departments are made. Policy process will vary according to the 
department/agency that is analyzed and hence there is a need for comparative research 
across both sectors and states (1993, 580). 
In their path-breaking work in this area, Hawkins and Thomas (1989, 3-30) identified two 
basic strategies pursued by local departmental-level officials in their administrative 
duties―enforcement or negotiation―with the aim of either educating the regulated target 
or punishing them. This analysis leads to the identification of four basic types of agency 
enforcement cultures: incentive-based systems designed to educate clients in either a 
coercive or negotiated way, and the punishment-oriented legalistic or voluntaristic 
alternative forms of agency conduct (see table A5 in the appendix). 
Looking at the issue from the point of view of the regulator, Mathew McCubbins 
provided a basic model of the structure of enforcement activities at the agency level and 
below (Lupia and McCubbins 1994; McCubbins and Schwartz 1984). McCubbins 
distinguishes between passive structures designed to monitor cooperative clients―such as 
administrative fire alarms and client self-reporting―and those more active structures put 
in place to deal with evasive clients―such as more active policing and training and 
licensing schemes (see table A6 in the appendix). 
Taken together these studies suggest that distinct administrative styles evolve at the local 
level based upon the day-to-day interactions of administrators and their targets. John 
Scholz (1984, 1991) has suggested that key elements in this style are administrative 
capacity and the level of trust existing between administrators and their clients. Following 
Scholzs logic, table 4 sets out the basic elements of a model of micro-level, agency-level 
administrative styles based upon these variables. 
TABLE 4 
A Model of Agency Enforcement Styles 
  Level of Trust Between Agency and Client 


















Again, as was the case with national and sectoral-level styles, the type of style found at 
the local agency level will have a significant effect upon determining both the nature of 
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the regulatory reforms required in a given area and their likelihood of success. Like the 
styles found at the other two levels, local agency styles have a significant impact on both 
the conceptualization and practical outcomes of reform efforts, and differences in these 
micro-level styles (like those found at the meso and macro levels) help to explain the 
patterns of convergences and divergences found throughout the world resulting from 
these efforts over the past two decades. 
CONCLUSION: THE IMPACT OF ADMINISTRATIVE STYLES ON 
REGULATORY REFORM 
Conceiving of an overall administrative style as a nested combination of institutional 
structures and administrative behaviors existing at multiple levels of analysis makes the 
concept more complex than many initially envisioned, but also more precise and easier to 
apply to practical questions such as the design and impact of regulatory reform. That is, 
reform efforts can be pitched at the structure or behavior of different levels of government 
and, if so, their impact will be felt primarily only upon the unit and level at which they are 
aimed, with their effects muted at different levels of administration. Only broad, well-
conceived, multi-level reform efforts are likely to generate consistent results rather than a 
patchwork of outcomes depending upon key factors such as the level of trust that exists 
between citizens and government and the administrative capacities existing at different 
levels of government. And even such broad-based initiatives would not be able to follow 
a one size fits all template, but would have to be carefully tailored to the particularities of 
the administrative styles found in that jurisdiction. This helps to explain why, for 
example, a similar recipe of NPM-inspired reforms can have both convergent and 
divergent effects across governments. 
A neo-institutional model of administrative styles, as set out here, thus helps to explain 
the OECD findings set out at the outset of this article. That is, a mixed pattern of 
convergence and divergence is explicable if one considers the nested nature of the 
different types of administrative styles identified above. Since each of the lower levels of 
institutional orders is located within a higher level, each level serves to filter or mediate 
the effects of changes at higher levels, moderating the impact of any changes which occur 
at those levels (Peled 2002). Thus, for example, the impact of global changes such as the 
diffusion of new ideas about appropriate state-society relations will be moderated by 
existing regulatory and agency styles, meaning managerial practices at the department or 
agency level may not be affected substantially by those reforms (Welch and Wong 2001; 
Knill 1999; Pollitt 2001a, 2001b; Bennett 1997). Similarly, changes which occur 
independently at lower levels will not necessarily impact at all on higher levels (Coleman 
and Grant 1998; Hills and Michalis 2000). 
Developing an understanding of the administrative styles found in any country is, of 
course, a nuanced and complex task (Barzelay and Fuchtner 2003). Disaggregating the 
concept of an administrative style and undertaking analysis at multiple levels, however, 
provides a useful methodology for such studies. The nested nature of styles means little 
can be assumed, a priori, about the effects of individual causal factors on the nature of the 
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interactions occurring between styles at different levels. However, careful case studies 
and empirical evaluations can allow specific conclusions to be drawn about the nature of 
these processes in different circumstances and the manner in which reform efforts must 
be at least minimally compatible with important aspects of existing styles if they are to 
have any chance of success (Borins 2001; Lindquist 2000; Peled 2002). 
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A Model of National Administrative Cultures 
  Administrator Identification with State 
  High Low 













A Model of National Civil Service Systems 
  State Participation in Economy 

















Means of Political 
Control of 
Administration Party/Judiciary Socialist, Fascist  






A Model of Sectoral Regulatory Cultures 
  Dominant Approach to Problem-Solving in the 
Sector 
  Anticipatory Reactive 
Consensus  Rationalist consensus 
culture 
 
Negotiation culture  
Relationship between 
Government and 
Society Imposition  Concertation culture Negotiation and 
conflict culture 
Source: Adapted from Richardson, Gustafsson, and Jordan (1982). 
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A Model of Sectoral Regulatory Regimes 
 Nature of the Policy Target 








Low Directed subsidization  
 
Public provision with 
oversight 
 
Source: Adapted from Howlett (2000b). 
 
TABLE A5 
A Model of Agency Enforcement Culture 
  Agency Purpose in Enforcement 
  Punish Educate 
Coerce Legalistic administration Negative incentive 
administration 
 
 Agency Strategy 




Source: Adapted from Hawkins (1984). 
 
TABLE A6 
A Model of Agency Enforcement Structure 
  Nature of Enforcement Target 
  Evasive Cooperative 
Coercive Active Policing Passive fire alarms Agency Enforcement 
Mechanism Negotiative Training and licencing Client self-reporting 




1. While the exact contours of neo-institutionalism are an item of some disagreement across disciplines, 
with different variations existing within political science, economics, and (historical) sociology, these 
approaches share the common ideas that rules, norms, and symbols affect political behavior; that the 
organization of governmental institutions affect what the state does; and that unique patterns of historical 
development constrain future choices.
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